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A Reformulation of the Economic Theory of Fertility
ABSTPAC
When parents are altruistic toward children, the choices of fertility and
consumption come from the maximization of a dynastic utility function. The
maximization conditions imply first, an arbitrage condition for consumption
across generations, and second, the equation of the benefit from an extra
child to the net cost of rearing that child. These conditions Imply that
fertility in open economies depends positively on the world Interest rate, on
the degree of altruism, and on the growth of child-survival probabilities;
and negatively on the rate of technical progress and the growth rate of
social security. The growth of consumption across generations depends on
changes in the net cost of rearing children, but not on interest rates or
tirne preference. Even when we Include life-cycle elements, we conclude that
thegrowth of aggregate consumption per capita depends in the long run on the
growth of consumption across generations. Thereby we show that real interest
rates and growth rates of consumption per capita would be unrelated in the
long run.
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The economic approach to fertility has emphasized the effects of parents'
income and the cost of rearing children. The most important determinants of
cost have been employment opportunities of children, the value of parents'
time spent on child care, monetary and psychological costs of avoiding births
through abstinence and birth—control methods, and the interaction between the
"quality" and quantity of children.
With the exception of work by Richard Easterlin (19'73) and a few others
(e.g., Becker [1981. Chapter 7]), studies that use an economic approach have
neglected the analytical links between decisions by different generations of
the same family. Moreover, despite Maithus's famous precedent, fertility has
not been integrated with the determination of wage rates, interest rates,
capital accumulation, and other macro variables (exceptions include Razin and
Ben Zion [1975] and WillIs (1985]).
This paper and a sequel develop an economic analysis of both linkages in
fertility across generations and of the interaction between fertility and
various macro variables (see Rarro and Becker [1985] for an earlier version).
In the present paper, wage rates and interest rates are parameters to each
family and toopen economies;-the sequel considers the determination of
interest rates, wage rates, population growth, and capital accumulation In
closed economies.
Our model is based on the assumption that parents are altruistic toward
children——hence, the utility of parents depends on the utility of each child
as well as on the consumption of parents. By relating the utility of
children to their own consumption and to the utility of their children, we2
derive a dynastic utility function that depends on the consumption and number
of descendants In all generations. We venture to use the word
'reformulation" In the title because of our emphasis on dynastic utility
functions and the number of descendants In all generations. The reformulated
approach provides a new way of looking at the determination of fertility.
Section 2 sets out a model of altruism toward children, and derives the
budget constraint and utility function of a dynastic family. The first-order
conditions to maximize utility imply that fertility in any generation depends
positively on interest rates and the degree of altruism, and negatively on
the rate of growth in the consumption of descendants. Consumption of a
descendant is positively related to the difference between the cost of
rearing a descendant and the value of his lifetime earnings.
Section 3 considers the effects of child mortality, subsidies to (or
taxes on) children, and social security and other transfer payments to
adults. Among other things, we show that the demand for surviving children
rises during the transition to low child mortality. However, this demand
returns to its prior level once mortalIty stabIlIzes at a lOW level.
Section 4 considers fertility and population growth in economies linked
to an international capital market but not an International labor market.
Among other results, we show that fertility is reduced by declines in
International interest rates, and by increases In an economy's rate of
technological progress. This analysis of fertility in open economies may
contribute to the explanation of low fertility in Western countries during
the past couple of decades.
Section 5 extends the analysis to include full life—cycle variations In
consumption, earnings, and utility. We show that fertility depends on the3
expenditure on the subsistence and human capital of children, but not on
expenditures that simply raise the consumption of children. We show also for
demographic steady states, that aggregate consumption does not depend on
interest rates, time preference or other determinants of life-cycle
variations in consumption.
2. A Model of Fertility and Population Change
We assume that each person lives for two generations, childhood and
adulthood. By assuming only one period of adulthood we omit life-cycle
considerations. However, we show in section 5 how to combine a life-cycle
analysis with the intergenerational forces that we stress in sections 2—4.
For simplicity, we pretend that each adult has children without "marriage."
We believe that production of children through marriage of men and women
would not affect the essence of the analysis. We also bypass issues related
to the spacing of children by assuming that parents have all of their
children at the beginning of adulthood.
Economic analyses of fertility have assumed that the utility of parents
depends on the number and 'quality' of children, usually without any
specification of how or why children affect utility. Although agnosticism
about preferences is common among economists, a more powerful analysis of
fertility and population change can be obtained by building on recent
discussions of altruism toward children.
The importance of altruism within families began to be recognized
systematically by economists during the 1970s (two early studies are Barro
[1974] and Becker [1974]). Obviously many parents are altruistic toward
their children in thesensethat the utility of parents depends positively4
on the utility of children. This paper relies heavily on the assumption of
altruism toward children to generate a dynamic analysis of population change.
If the utility of a parent were an additively-separable function of own





where U0 Is parental utility, v is a standard utility function (with v' >0,
v'' <0),U11 is the utility of the ith child, and n0 Is the number of
children. Since reactions by parents to differencesamong their children are
not Important for the Issues discussed In this paper,1 we simplify by
assuming that siblings are identical; hence the function =is the same
for all children. If this function is Increasing and concave in theutility
of each child, U1 •,thenthe parent's utility is maximized when all children
attain the same level of utility,
U1
=. forall i and j.Then parent's




With the further assumption that the function * is proportional toU1, so
that #(U1, n0) =U1a(n0),parent's utility would be given by
'See the discussions In Becker(1981, Chapter 6), Sheshlnski and Weiss
(1982), and Behrrnan, et al. (1982).5
(3) U0 =v(c0) a(n0)n0U1.
The term a(n0) measures the degree of altruism toward each child, and
converts the utility of children Into that of parents. We assume that, for
given utility per child U1, parental utility Is Increasing and concave in the
number of children n0.This property, together with equation (3), requires
the altruism function to satisfy the conditions,
(4) a(n0) ÷ n0a'(n0) >0and 2a'(n0) +n0a'(n0)
<0,
where we neglect integer restrictions on the number of children.
We assume that the parameters of a parents utility function are the same
for all generations of a dynastic family. Therefore, the utility of each
child, U1, depends as in equation (3) on own consumption, c1, and on the
number, n1, and utility, Uj,, of own children. If the presentation is
simplified by neglecting utility during childhood (see section 5), then ;je
haveaftersubstituting for U In equation (3)
(5) U0 =v(c0)
÷a(n0)n0v(c1) a(n0)a(n1)n0n1U2.
Note that U2 is the utility of each grandchild, and n0n1 is the number of
grandchildren.
Utility functions like that in equation (3) have been criticized for
neglecting altruism toward grandchildren (md perhaps great—grandchildren,
etc.). Equation (5) shows that this criticism Is invalid because,6
Indirectly, grandparents are altruistic toward grandchildren. A sore subtle
claim is that the indirect altruism toward grandchildren must be weaker than
the direct altruism toward children. Even this criticism does not
necessarily hold, because the utility function in equation (5) does not
require the altruism toward grandchildren to be less than that toward
children. This property holds only if a(n1) <1.
The utility of great-grandchildren would appear In the utility function
If in equation (5) were replaced by terms that depend on c2,
n2 and U3.
By continuing to substitute later consumption and fertility, we arrive at a
dynastic utility function that depends on the consumption and number of
children of all descendants of the same family line. This dynastic utility
function can be expressed as
(6) U0 = A1N1v(c1),
i=0
where A. Is the inplied degree of altruism of the dynastic head toward each
descendant in the ith generation, as given by
i—i
(7) A0 =1,A1 a(n).
I =1,2
j =0
Is the number of children per adult in generation J, N. is the number of
descendants In the ith generation, as given by7
i—i
(8) N =1, N. = a., I =1,2,....
0
j=0
and c. is the consumption per adult in generation i.
At a point where a parent has one child, a =1,we can say that a parent
is 'selfish' If the marginal utility of his own consumption exceeds the
marginal utility that he derives from his child's consumption. This
definition implies a(1) < 1 for selfish parents. Since the utility of a
dynastic family with stationary consumption per person (c1 =c)and a
stationary number of descendants (N. =1)would be bounded only i aCi) < 1,
we assume that parents are "selfish.'
The analysis simplifies greatly if the degree of altruism toward
children has a constant elasticity with respect to the number of
children——that is,
(9) .-i(n. ) =iu.
1 1
In this case the degree of altruism toward descendants. A1 in equation (7).
i—i
depends only on the number of descendants in generation i N =flj
j =0
specifically, A. ='(N.).We use this simplification for the subsequent
analysis. Then the condition 0 < a(l) < 1 requires 0 << 1. and the
condition that parental utility is increasing and concave In the number of
children for given utility per child (as ensured by the inequalities in
expression (4)) corresponds to 0 < 1.By substituting the altruism
function from equation (9) into the expression for dynastic utility in





Suppose that we change the number of descendants in generation i,
while holding fixed the total consumption,C =N.e.,for generation i, as
well as the number and consumption per person in other generations
(N and c
for j 1). Then the change In (J0 measures the benefit or loss from having
more people in generation i to consume a given aggregate quantity of goods.
Since the production of children is costly, an increase inN1 in this manner
must raise (J0 near a utility-maximizing position (if children are being
produced). Otherwise, people would do better with fewer children.The
derivative of in equation (10) with respect toN1-—holdlng fixed C. and
the values of c. andN for all other generations--Is positive only if
(11) (c.) < 1 —
whereo(c.j a v'(C1)c./v(c.) is the elasticity of utility with respect to
consumption c.. This condition is important for the subsequent discussion.
Each adult supplies one unit of labor to the market andearns the wage
2
w.. Adults leave a bequest of (non—depreciable) capital, to each
child. e assume as a convention that bequests occur at thebeginning of
period 1. Since the capital k. earns rentals at the rate r., an adult in
generation i spends his total resources, w. +(1rik., on own consumption.
2The labor-leisure choicecan readily be incorporated by including leisure
along with consumption in they function, and by considering a 'full-income"
budget equation (see ramura, 1985).9
C., on bequests to children, n1k11, and on costs of raising children. We
assume that each child costs ,&,sothat n1/31 is the total cost of raising
children to adulthood. Therefore, the overall budget condition for an adult





The parameter represents a cost of raising children that is
Independent of the 'quality" of children (as measured by their consumption,
c. ,wagerate, w. ,orinheritance, k ).Tocapture the emphasis in the
1+1 1+1 1+1
fertility literature on the value of parents' time, we sometimes assume that
is proportional to the parent's wage rate, w1. We assume also that debt
can be left to children——that is, bequests can be negative as well as
positive.
The optimization problem as seen by the dynastic head is tomaximize
ui1ityLJ inequation(10),subject to the budget constraints in equation
(12)andto the initial assets k0. In carrying out this maximization, each
Individual takes as given the path of wage rates, w1, interest rates, r1, and
child—rearing costs, /3. The chosen path of consumption per adult, C0, c1,
300nsumption c, and numbers of descendantsN1 must also be non-negative In
each generation. However, we neglect integer restrictions on N1. Ponzi
games, in hlch the debt grows forever as fast as or faster than the interest
rate, would be ruled out ifthepresent value (as of period 0)ofdebt
ipproache zero syrnptotically.c2 capital stock per adult; k1, k2 and number of descendants;
N2
must be consistent with this maximization problem.4
The first—order conditions can be obtained in the usual manner, with
allowance for a Lagrange multiplier for each period that corresponds to ea::





(14) v(c1)[l —€— o(c)}=V (c1)[/311(1r1) —w.], I =1,2,
6
where o(c.) Is again the elasticity of v(c.) with respect to c.There
We pretend that the dynastic head can oick the entire tine path. However
esen aU Wlj.iLCC ap&uum LhC JLI, ailUULU LLaeflU iien.-
todeviate from the choices made initially.In other words, decisions are
time—consistent across generations. Note also that, as long as all the
capital stocks k. are positive, bequests from parents to children are als:
positive.
3The second-order condition Is (1-€)vv''/(v')2<0(see the appendL
If 0(c1) Is the constant c, then this condition reduces to a €.< 1,whic:
Is expression (11).
6We assume that the parameters of the utility function and budget constra::
lead to a finite level of utility. For a steady state with constant value
of /3, w, r. c and n, this requires (1 -r)>n,which is the standard
condition that the interest rate exceeds the growth rate (of population)
equation (13), a constant c implies n [a(lr)]1, so that (1 r( >
requIres(1 r)' <1/a.Hence, utility ou1d be unbounded if the
interest rate .ere too high.ii
alsothe dynastic budget constraint, which equates the present value of all
resources to the present value of all expenditures,7







Equation (13) is the usual arbitrage condition for shifting consumption
from one generation to the next. Aside from the term that depends on
fertility, n1, this equation expresses the familiar result that the utility
rate of substitution between consumption in periods i and 1+1,
depends inversely on the time-preference" factor, ,and
the interest—rate factor, 1 +r .Thestandard conclusion is that a rise
1+1
In or r, increases c relative to c.. An increase In fertility, n, i1 1÷1 1 1
lowersaitruisn per child, given by a(n.), and therebyincreasesthe disc:t
onfuture consumption. Therefore, higher jertiiity is associated with a
reduction in c relative to c ,foro'lven values of r.and .
1+1 i 1÷1
Equation (14) says that the marginal benefit of an additional child (or
equivalently of an additional adult descendant for the next period) balances
the marginal cost. The right side of the equation is the net lifetime cost
of an additional adult in generation i. The earnings of each adult,
7The dynastic budget equation follows from the constraints for each period.
as shown in equation (12), as long as the transversallty condition Is
satisfied: the present value of the future capital stock must approach :e:
asymptotically. We also use the constraint on borrowing, which is discusse
in a. 3 above.12
subtract from the cost of rearing a child In generation i-i, valued in goods
of generation i (.1(l + r1)). The left side of equation (14) is
essentially the effect on utility from adding an additional adult descendant
in generation 1, N1, while holding fixed •the total consumption C. of that
generation.8 As discussed earlier, this marginal utility must bepositive
near an optimal position, which ImplIes 1 -0(c.)> 0 (see expression
(ii)).
Equation (14) Indicates that children would be a financial burden to
altruistic parents: the cost of rearing an additional child would exceed his
lifetime earnings. Otherwise, altruistic parents would maximize utility by
having as many children as were biologically feasible. Caldwell (1982), among
others, argues that parents in less—developed countries want as many children
as possible because children are profitable in the sense that their earnings
as child laborers exceed the cost of rearing them.Altruistic parents would
want as many children as possible even when child labor was not profitable,
if the lifetimeearningsof children exceeded the cost of rearing the
marginal child.
With the definition, a(c.)v'(c1)c1/v(c.), equation (14) can be
rewritten as
(16) c[1 —- C(01)}/Q(c1)= + r.)—
w1,
I =1,2,
Differentiatethe appropriate term in equation (10) with respect to
N1while
holding fixed C1. Aside from the factor, a'(N.) ,theresult is the left
side of equation (14).13
The left side would be proportional to c. If a(c,) were constant. Otherwise,
we assume that o(c,) either falls or increases slowly enough with c. so that
the left side is increasing in c1. Then equation (16) implies thatc1 is a
positive function of the net cost of producing another descendant In
geheration I.It follows that consumption per person,c1, grows across
generations only if the net cost of creating descendants also grows. Hence.
descendants have the same consumption if they are equally costly to produce.
In contrast, the usual models of optimal consumption over time imply that
consumption grows (or falls) over time if the interest rate exceeds (or is
less than) the rate of time preference. In our analysis, the rate of growth
between generations of consumption per person is essentially Independent of
the level of Interest rates, and also does not depend on the rate of altruism
or time preference, as summarized by the parameter a.
The main effects from changes in the level of interest rates or In the
degree of altruism show up on fertility, n.. We can rewrite equation (13) to
solve out for the fertility rate:
l/€ (17) n. =[a(lr1)v (c.1)/v (cj]
,1 = 0,1,
Equation (16) pegs the intertemporal—substitution term, v(c.1)/v(c.), for
I =1,2 becausec. in each future generation depends only on the net
cost of producing descendants. For example, if the cost were the same for
all generations, the intertemporal-substjtutjon term would be unity. Since
substitution in consumption is pegged, the fertility rate, n. for i =1,2.
rises with increases in the. interest rate, r. ,orthe rate of
1÷114
altruism, a. flote that these responses satisfy the arbitrage condition for
shifting consumption across generations, even though the time path of
consumption per person does not change. For this given behavior of
consumption per person, higher values of interest rates or of the rate of
1tru1sm motivate a family to have descendants later rather than sooner—-that
is, fertility rates rise.
Richard Easterlin, a pioneer In analyzing the effects of
intergenerational relations on fertility, has argued (1973) that fertility
depends negatively on the wealth of parents compared to own wealth because
growing up in a wealthy family shifts preferences toward own consumption at
the expense of children. Put differently, fertility Is said to be positively
related to the growth In wealth from the previous to the present generation.
Fertility in our model also depends on the rate of growth between
generations, but it depends negatively on the growth between own consumption
and consumption per capita of the nextgeneration.Moreover, in our model,
preferences are invariant with wealth and have thesameform for each
generation.
Another important property of the model concerns the effect of changes in
we3lth,which we can represent by shifts in the initial assets k0. Equation
(16) implies that consumption per person in each future generation, c. for
1, 2 depends only on the net cost of descendants, .i(1 +r.)-
w..If a shift In wealth leaves unchanged the cost of raising children,
and the wage rate of descendants,w1, then there is no effect on future
consumption per person, c..In this case it also follows from equation (17)
thatfuture fertility, n. for i =1,2 does not change with a shift in15
wealth. With future consumption per capita and future fertility unchanged,
the dynastic budget equation (15) implies that either initial consumption,
c0.orfertility, n0, must change. Using equation (17) for I =0,we can see
that an increase (or decrease) In c0 must be accompanied by an increase (or
decrease) in no. That is, wealthier persons consume more and also have
larger families.
The results imply that an increase in say inherited wealth would increase
only the scale of a dynastic family. The number of descendants, and
aggregate consumption, C1, in each future generation would increase by the
same proportion as the increase in initial fertility, n0. We can see this
result directly by recalling that N. =n0n1
... forI =1,2,
Substitution for each fertility rate from equation (17) leads to
I





An increase in wealth raises c0 and thereby lowers the marginal utility of
wealth, v'(c0). Since all future values of c. are unchanged, equation (18)
shows that all future values of rise by the same proportion.
Future capital per person, k. for i =1,2 would not change with a
shift In wealth because future consumption per person, c., and fertility, fl1
areunchanged. This result follows from the budget conditions in equation
(12) and from the dynastic budget constraint in equation (15). Consequently.
bequests to each descendant of the dynastic head are unaffected by a change
In dynastic wealth.Stated differently, wealth completely regresses to the mean between
parents and each child because wealthier parents would spend all of their
additional resources on their own consumption and on raising larger families
A positive relation between wealth and fertility may help to explain the
significant regression toward the mean in the wealth of parents and each
child in the United States and other countries (see Becker and Tomes. 1986,
Table 2). Although our analysis goes too far by implying complete regressi::
to the mean over one generation, we show below that this extreme result no
longer holds if the cost of having children, p.,dependson the number of
children.
Dynastic utility in equation (6) is a time—separable function of the
number of descendants and consumption in each generation, and does not depen
explicitly on the fertility of any generation. Demand functions derived frc-
time-separable utility functions depend only the marginal utility of wealth
and the prices of variables with the same date. Consequently, if we hold
constant the narginal utility of wealth, the number of descendants and
consumption in any generation would not be affected by price changes in oth':
generations. For example, an increase in the net cost of producing
descendants for generation j alone would not change the number of descendan:..
In later generations, i >j.Fertilitywould rise sufficiently between th
jth and (j-l)stgenerations to maintain the number of descendants in all
later generations.
To illustrate these results, consider a tax on raising children in
generation j,whichraises p.butdoes not change p.fori *j.Furthermor
to abstract from wealth effects (which we have already discussed), assume17
compensating increase in initial assets, k0, that leaves the marginal utility
of wealth, v'(c0), unchanged. Equation (16) Indicates thatCj1 rises, but
all other c1 do not change. Equation (17) indIcates that fertility in
generation j falls (chiidren are now more costly to produce), while fertilty
in j1 rIses. Moreover, equation (18) implies that the Increase in
fertility in generation j1 exactly offsets the fall in generation j.
Hence, the nuiaber of descexdan after the (j --l)stgeneration Is not
affected by the tax In geiat1on j.
Similarly, a decreasc n wages for one generation, compensated to hold
constant the marginal utIlity of wealth, reduces fertility in the previous
generation and raises fertility in the same generation by equal percentages.
Again, the number of descendants in later generations does not change. As it
were, the fertility rates of adjacent generations are perfect substitutes in
the production of descendants: any change In the net cost of producing
descendants in one generation causes enough substitution from the fertility
inthesucceeding generation to leave unchanged the number of descendants in
subsequentgenerations.
Consider now a permanent increase In the cost of children that raises the
net cost of children, 1(l -r11) -w11
,bythe same proportion for each
generation I > j.re we again hold constant the marginal utility of wealth,
v'(c0), equation (16) implies that consumption per person rises In generation
j1 and in each subsequent generation. Further, if we now assume as an
pprox1matIon that the elasticity of utility Is the constant a, then the
increases in Cj1. c.2, .. . areequiproportional. The arbitrage condition





Therefore, the equiproportional Increases in c1 for i =j 1 imply
that fertility in generation i falls (because cj/c.1 declines), while
fertility In all other generations is unchanged. Consequently, given
interest rates, even a permanent (compensated) tax on children reduces
fertility only In the generation where the tax is first enacted. However,
the effect on Incentives is permanent because the utility function of an
altruistic, dynastic family depends on the number of descendants, rather than
on fertility itself, and the decline In fertility in one generation alone
reduces the number of descendants In all later generations.
The permanent increase inforI >jmeans also that consumption per
person, c1 for I >j,is permanently higher. Since is higher while n1 Is
unchanged (for i >j),the right side of equation (12) indicates a larger
level of expenditure per person in each period. This greater expenditure is
financed by higher levels of capital and bequests per person, k. for I >
Theassumption that the cost of rearing each.child Is independent of the
number of children Is crucial to our conclusion first, that wealth completely
regresses to the mean over one generation, and second, that a permanent tax
on children reduces fertility only in the initial generation. The
qualitative properties survive natural modifications of this specification,
but adjustments to disturbances can now take several generations.
9mis result assumes that the family's totalcapital stock is growing at a
rate below the interest rate-—that is, if the capital stocks are positive,
<1+r1.This condition must hold in a steady state, where
k =kand 1 ÷r>n--seen. 6 above. 1*1 1To Illustrate, let the cost of rearing n children be given by
(20) b(n), where b' >0arid b' 0.
Prev1c.sly, the marginal cost, b'(n), equaled the constant .NowmargIna..
costs Increase or decrease with n, depending on the sign of b''(n). Forces
that favor b' '> 0are a rise In the shadow price of parents' time as the
amount of child—care Increases, and an Increase In the physical burden of
bearing children as the number of children Increases. On the other hand,
can be negative over some range because of economies of scale In raising
children, and because the opportunity cost of preventing births would '1l
when the number of children rose. We assume that the first set of fr:es
eventually dominates, so that b'' >0applies in the range of our analysis.
This modification to tcostof rearing children does not affect the
arbitrage condition for shifi,' consumption across generations, as given
equation (13). However, the other set of first—order conditions changes
that shown in equation (14) to







Theexpression on the right side Is the net cost of raising an additional
descendant for generation I when the number of descendants In other
generations Is held constant. The term, b'(n11)(1 ÷r1)
-
w1,corresponc:
to that In our previous analysis (where b!(rl.1)= Thenew term on20
the far right arises because an Increase Inn11, and hence In N1, means that
would fall for a given value of N11. This new term is negative if the
marginal cost of raising children In generation i, b'(n1), exceeds the
average cost, b(n)/n1, for then a decrease in n lowers the average cost of
raising children In generation 1.
Even with a rising or falling marginal cost of rearing children, equation
(21) implies that the steady-state value of c depends on the steady-state
value of a, and on the values of b'(l +r)and w. Equation (13), in turn,
Implies that the steady-state fertility rate still depends only on the
interest rate and the rate of altruism, a.
When the marginal cost of children is constant, we have shown that
transitions between steady states take only one generation. Steady states
remain stable even when marginal costs are increasing (see Section 2 of the
appendix), but transitions now take several generations.
As an example of the dynamic effects that arise, consider an Increase in
initial assets, k0. When the marginal cost of children was assumed to be
constant, we found that an increase in k0 increasedc0 and n0, but did not
change future values of c1 and n..If marginal costs are rising (b'' >Q),
an increase in n raises b'(n0), which increasesc1 (by equation (21)). An
increase in c1 raises n1 (by equation (13)), which increasesc2, and so on.
In this way, the increase in wealth would be spread over increases in
consumption per person and fertility In several generations. However, the
effects on consumption per person and fertility become smaller over time as
the steady state Is approached. Although consumption per person and assets
per person still regress to the mean from parents to children, the process Is
now a gradual one across generations, rather than being completed in a single
generation.21
III. Economic Growth, Child Mortality and Social Security
Return now to the simpler case where the cost per child Is Independent
of the number n1. Then a temporary change in the cost of children in one
generation induces an oscillation In fertility over that generation and the
subsequent one, whereas a permanent change In cost starting In a particular
generation alters fertility only in that generation. A permanent fall In
fertility would require a continuous rise in the cost of children. Assume,
for example, that the interest rate is the constant r, while wages, the cost
of rearing children, and hence the net cost of descendants are each rising at
a constant rate—-due say to steady economic growth. Then, If the elasticity
of utility is the constant a, equation (16) ImplIes that the consumption of
descendants, c1, would rise at the same rate as the net cost of descendants.
A higher rate of growth In consumption per person would reduce fertility
permanently, given the values of a and r (see equation (19)).
The decline in fertility observed since the mid—l9th century in most
Western countries has sometimes been xp1ained by rapid economic growth that
continues to raise the cost of children through raising the value of parents
time (see, for example, Becker, 1981, Chapter 11). This explanation has not
been based on a formal model that links fertility to economic growth, and our
model does not have this Implication. As we have seen, a steady rate of
economic growth that induced a steady growth in the net cost of descendants
would permanently lower fertility, but would not generate a persistent fall
in fertility. A persistent fall requires either that interest rates fall
steadily, or that economic growth continues to accelerate, or that the net
cost of descendants accelerates for other reasons.The secular decline in fertility has also been explained by the secular
decline in child mortality that continued to reduce the number of births
required to produce a target number of surviving children. Our analysis also
has novel implications about the effects of declines in child mortality on
birth rates and the demand for surviving children.
To simplify the presentation, we assume that wage rates and interest
rates are constant over time. Also, parents Ignore the uncertainty about
child deaths, and respond only to changes in the fraction, p, of offsprings
that survive childhood. If °b Is the number of births, then the expected
number of survivors is
(22) =
Let3 be the cost of rearing a child to adulthood, and 3 the cost of a
child that dies prior to becoming an adult. Since the latter cost includes
any psychic losses from child mortality, could exceed .Theexpected
cost of b births is [p +(1-m1bEquation (22) implies that the
ratio of this expected cost to the expected number of survivors n--which





As before, parents choose own consumption, the expected number of surviving
children, and beque3ts to surviving children, subject to a budget constraint
that depends on /3.23
A permanent decline in the level of child mortality--that is, a rise in
p——that starts in the jth generation would lower the cost of raising
surviving children, /3. for I >J.Our prior analysis implies that the demand
for surviving children per adult (n1) rises in the .jth generation, but would
not be affected In later generations.1°Although the demand for surviving
children increases in generation j, birth rates may fall because the higher
probability of survival, p, reduces the number of births, b' needed to
produce a given number of survivors (see equation (22)). Birth rates
definitely fall in later generations because the demand for surviving
children in these generations would not be affected by the Increase in p.
The demand for surviving children per adult would increase for more than
one generation if the probability of surviving childhood continued to rise,
because then the cost of rearing surviving children would continue to fall
over time. However, the rate of increase in the survival probability must
slow down once this probability approaches unity, as it has in the West
during the past forty years. As the rate of increase slows, the rate of
decline in the cost of producIng survivors also slows and eventually more or
less ceases. Thereafter, the cumulative increase in child survival
probability would not affect the demand for surviving children, but would
reduce birth rates by the same percentage as the Increase in survival
probability.
101f the marginal cost of a child increases with the number of children
(b'>0In expression (20)), future values of n for I >jwould rise in
response to a permanent decline in nortallty rates starting in generation j.
But eventually, the demand for surviving children would return to its
previous value.24
Our analysis of altruistic dynastic families explains why the transition
to regimes of low child mortality nay have only temporary effects on
population growth, and why changes in birth rates often lag behind changes In
child mortality. The analysis implies a rise in population growthduring the
early phases of the transition, but eventually population growth would return
to that prevailing prior to the transition. Correspondingly, the declines in
birth rates accelerate, until the percentage decline from prior levelsequals
the percentage increase in the probability of surviving to adulthood.
The secular decline, in fertility has also been explainedpartly by the
growth in social security and other transfer payments to the elderly. Public
transfers to old persons would reduce the demand for children Ifsupport from
children had been helping to protect parents against 111 health, low
earnings, and other conditions of old age. Our model of altruistic families
implies that growing transfer payments to the elderly would reduce the demand
for children, even when children do not support elderlyparents.
The model is not set up to incorporate social securityprecisely because
we have only one period of adulthood, and cannot Introduce payments to old
(retired) adults that are financed on a pay—as—you-go basis by taxes onyoung
(working) adults. However, similar results obtain If we imagine
(unrealistically) that transfers to adults are financed by levies on
children.
Let s be the transfer received by the representative adult ingeneration
I, and be the tax paid during generation i by each child (or byparents
on behalf of their children), Then the governmentts budget constraint is
s N =r
,whichimplies I I t+i25
(24) r11 =s1/n.
For given values of fertility, the benefits from social security and the
taxes to finance them have exactly offsetting effects on the dynastic wealth
of the representative family. Therefore, a change In the scale of the social
security program would not affect intergenerational patterns of consumption
if fertility were unchanged. Parents would use their social security
benefits to pay their ch1ldrens taxes; in a more general context, parents
would raise their bequests sufficiently to enable their children to pay these
taxes without cutting back on their consumption (see Barro, 1974).
However, this so-called "Ricardlan Equivalence Theorem" must be modified
when parents choose the number of children. An extra child in generation I
would pay the tax, r. =s./n.,and would receive the transfer s. when he
1+1 11 1+1
becomes an adult. Thus, the social security program imposes the net tax per
child of
'25'
, — / iS.ifl. S -r.
11 14-1 11.
where sjl/(l +r11)
is the present value of the future transfer. With
constant benefits per person Is11 5.=s),the net tax is positive if 1 +
>n1.''
Recall that this condition must hold in the model in a steady
state.
11More generally, we need that total social security payments grow slower
than the Interest rite——that is. n s.is.<I r.
I i+-1 I i-l26
With 1 ÷r. >n.,anIncrease in the scale of the social security 1+1 1
program(an increase in s) would raise the net cost of a child and would have
the same substitution effects as an Increase in the cost of raising a child.
Therefore, our previous analysis of changes in the costs of children
applies to changes in social security. For example, a permanent increase in
the level of social security benefits starting in generation ,j is analogous
to a permanent increase in p1atthis date. Holding fixed the marginal
utility of wealth, v'(c0), we found that fertilityn declines, fertility in
later generations,n1 for I >j,does not change, and the number of
descendants, N. for I >j,falls by the same percentage in each future
generation. Therefore, a permanent increase in social security benefits
tends to reduce fertility (temporarily) even when children do not support
their parents.12
We also found before that a permanent increase In child-rearing costs in
generation j would raise consumption and wealth per person in future
eneratjons, c. and 1<. for i >j.In the same way, the negative effect of
higher social security benefIts on the number of descendants would be
associated with an Increase in "capital intensity." This finding contradicts
the usual argument, as in Feldstein (1974), that social security lowers
capital Intensity. That argument treats fertility as exogenous and neglects
the interplay between consumption and intergenerational transfers.
Our model implies that the dramatic growth in transfer payments to the
elderly during the past 50 years reduced fertility rates. However, it also
implies that fertility would return to its prior value once the growth in
12
For discussions of the initial impact of social security, see Becker and
Tomes 1976, n. 15, Wildaslu 1985, and WillIs 1986.27
these transfers slowed appreciably. Therefore, in the long run, a larger
social security program would not affect fertility rates, but would lower
population levels and raise consumption and wealth per person.
4. Open Economies and Western Fertility
Our formulation can be used to analyze the determinants of fertility In
an open economy, defined as an economy connected to an international capital
market with a single real interest rate. Wages are determined In each
economy separately because labor Is assumed to be immobile across national
boundaries. Wage rates (per unit of human capital) would differ between
economies with the same interest rate If production functions differed, if
returns to scale were Increasing or decreasing, or If wages were taxed at
different rates.




where the superscript j denotes the country and r11 Is the world interest
rate. Defining n =1 -s-p',where is the (natural) growth rate of the
adult population in country j between generations i and 1÷1, we have
j r j
(27) p3
log(a ) li-i— gJ
1 €3
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where g Is the growth rate of consumption per person in country J between
generations i and 1÷1. Equation (16) implies that this growth rate is




(28)g. =_________ = ____________________ — 1.
1 c. _i(1 +r1)
—
Thefirst term on the right—hand side of equation (27) indicates that
population grows more rapidly In economies where parents are more altruistic
(as), and where the degree of altruism is lessresponsive to the number of
children (i)Thesecond term shows that population growth is more rapid
when the world real Interest rate is higher. Moreover, the responses In
population growth exceed variations in Interest rates because .'< 1.For
small values of €,evensmall fluctuations in world Interest rates would
Induce sizable fluctuations In population growth rates. The term on the far
right indicates that population grows more rapidly in open economies where
consumption per person grows more slowly. Open economies would differ more
In populatIon growth than iR consumption growth because (i -0J)/>1in
each economy (see expression (11)).
The growth In consumption per person between generations equals the
growth in the net cost of descendants (see equation (28)]. The latter Is
negatively related to growth in the probability of child survival, and Is
positively related to growth In social security benefits or in other taxes on
children. Faster technical progress also raises the growth of consumption
per person, at least If the cost of raising children, ,33, tends to grow along
with wage rates. Therefore, population growth should be lower inopeneconomies that have more rapid technological progress, more rapid increases
in social security benefits, and slower declines in child mortality.
These Implications of our analysis seem relevant to the low fertility in
Western countries since the late l960s. World interest rates were low until
the l980s-—for example, interest rates on short-term U.S. government
securities averaged 1.8% per year from 1948 to 1980 after adjusting for
anticipated Inflation (see Barro, 1986 Ch. 7). Economic growth was
rapid—-specifically, the annual rate of growth in per capita real GDP
averaged 3.7% per year from 1950 to 1980 in 9 IndustrIalized countries that
include the United States (Barro, 1986 Ch. 11). Child mortality in the West
was already quite low by 1950 and did not Improve much further. Social
security payments and other transfers to adults expanded dramatically during
the past thirty years. For example, per capita real social security payments
in the United States and Great Britain grew by 7 1/2 and 5 percent per year,
respectively, from 1950 to 1982 (see Hemming, 1984, and U.S. Department of
Commerce, 1965, 1984). All of these forces tended to hold downpopulation
growth.
These considerations also suggest that Western fertility will rise during
the next decade if the high real interest rates of the 1980s continue Into
the 1990s, If the growth in social security and other transfer payments slows
appreciably--as eventually It must-—and if the slowdown in economic growth
that began In the early 1970s continues. Moreover, fertility could respond
sharply even to small changes in Interest rates, in the growth rate of
transfer payments, and In rates of economic growth, because changes in these
variables are magnified Into larger changes in fertility.30
5. Life-Cycle and Aggregate Consumption
To simplify the presentation, we have assumed that childhood and
adulthood are the only periods of life, and that childhood provides no
utility. However, we can readily incorporate a full life cycle into the
model. We use this extended model to compare the determinants of consumption
over the life cycle with the determinants between generations, and also to
show how aggregate consumption relates to life—cycle and generational
Consumption.
We continue to neglect uncertainty about age of death, but now assume
that everyone lives foryears. A parent is assumed to have all his
children when he is h years old, where the value of h determines the length
of a generation. We assume additive preferences over the life cycle, where
v(c..) is the utility at age jofeach descendant in generation i from the
consumption, c1. These current period utilities over the life cycle are
discounted by the constant tine-preference factor. 5. Therefore, the utility
generated by the lifetime consumption ofsomeonein generation i is
(29)
v1 Si 1v (C
Asbefore, the overall utility of the dynastic head is
(30) U A.N.v. 0 '.iii.
i=031
where A. is the weight attached to the utils of generation i. e now note
explicitly that A. incorporates both time preference and the degree of
altruism toward children. As before, the degree of altruism toward each
child vries inversely with the number of children. Specifically, we again
assume a function of the form a(n.). Then the weight A in equation (30)
is
(31)A. =(a8h)(N)€=
Notethat the parameter a (which corresponds to the parameter a in our
previous model) equals 5h__that is. it includes both altruism (a) and time
preference (5h)
Substitution from equation (31) into equation (30) leads to the




where v. is given in equation (29). Note that lifecycle utilities, v(C1)
in equation (29). are discounted only by time preference (6), while
generational utilities, v. in equation (32), are discounted also by the
degree of altruism toward descendants (that is, by a1(N.)l =
(;öh)1(N)l€)Some have claimed that rational individuals would not
discount future utility. However, even if people did not discount the futur'
(5 1), the coefficient A. in equation(31)need not equalunitybecause32
rational individuals might prefer their children's consumption to their own,
or vice versa. The latter condition holds in biological models of gene
maximization when a parent only has some genes in common with each offspring.
If parents are selfish" (a <1),dynastic utility would be bounded in a
stationary state (N. =1and c. ,= cfor all 1, k) even without preference
1
forthe present (even if .5 >1)as long as .5 <(a)1.Models of Infinitely
lived individuals-—which do not distinguish between time preference and
altruism toward descendants——typically assume preference for the present
('5 <1)in order to bound the utility function.












are the present values at the beginning of generation i of lifetime earnings
and consumption forgenerationI.For convenience, we now assume a constant
interest rate.r.33
When dynastic utility in equation (32) Is maximized subject to dynastic
resources in equation (33), the first—order conditions are
v'(c.




'''= —' ,forI =0,1 and j =1, 2
v'.(c. .) h
,)ij a(l÷r)
Equation (35) is the usual arbitrage relation for life cycles——specifically,
it involves the Interest rate, r, and the time—preference factor, 5. Since
the right-hand side of equation (35) Is Independent of the generation, I, the
ratio of marginal utilities of consumption over the life cycle is the same
for all generations.
Equation (36), which is the arbitrage relation across generations, is
essentially the same as equation (13). Since the right-hand side of equation
(36) is independent of age, j, we find that the ratio of marginal utilities
of consumption between generations Is the same for all ages.
We can solve the arbitrage relations for the rates of growth of
consumption between ages and generations if we again assume that the
elasticity of utility with respect to consumption is the constant :
a'C.
(37) v.(c, ,) = for all I. j.
313 aThe term captures any effects of age on the marginal utility of
consumption. For example, the relatively low consumption of young children
that has stimulated the literature on child-equivalent scales implies
relatively low values ofat young ages. By substituting equation (37) in:










h' for all i, j.
a(l÷r)
If a is constant, the first-order condition that relates consumption to
the net lifetime cost of descendants is
(40) =(1r)8.1 -., forall 1, 2,
This equation Is the same as equation (16), except that the present values
lifetime consumption and earnings in generation i (.andw.) replace the
consumption and earnings during aduithood. By substituting equations (34)
and (38) into equation (40), we can solve explicitly for the growth in






,for1= 1,2,..., and j= 1,2, .. .
ii (l+r) /3j
Therate of growth in consumption per descendant across generations is
the same at all ages, and equals the rate of growth between these generations
in the net cost of children. Given the rate of growth of these net costs,
the growth of consumption per descendant does not depend on time preference
(43),thedegree of selfishness (a), or the interest rate (r). In contrast,
equation (38) shows that the rate of growth of consumption over the life
cycle does not depend on the cost of children, but does depend in the usual
way on the interest rate and time preference. Therefore, even when parents
are not 'selfish" (say a =1),the rates of growth in consumption over the
life cycle and between generations are equal only by accident. Once again we
find that models with infinitely lived individuals who do not reproduce have
very different implications from models with reproducing generations.






(42) =a (1 -r) h
(l+r) /3.— i+1
where recall that a = Fertilityis positively related to the extent of
altruism (a), to the tine—preference factor (5), and to the interest rate
(r). Consumption per descendant does not depend on interest rates and tine
preference essentially because fertility does. When interest rates increase.
a dynastic family accumulates capital in the form of additional descendants
rather than additional capital per descendant.36
Fertility also depends negatively on the growth between generations in
the net cost of producing children. Net costs equal the difference between
the fixed costs of children ((l-r)i3) and the present value of their lifetime
earnings (i),bothmeasured in units of goods in the same generation. Notice
that the relevant measure of cost does not depend separately on thepart of
earnings that children receive prior to leaving home or prior to reaching
their majority. Given parental altruism, the children'searnings as adults
also matter. The "fixed' costs of raising children include theexpenditures
necessary to produce the lifetime earnings of children: not only the cost of
giving birth, but also expenditures on subsistence and on investments in the
human capital of children. Expenditures on children'sconsumption that
simply raise the utility of children are not part of the net costs of having
children and hence do not affect the demand for children.rn particular,
expenditures on the consumption of children who live at home would not affect
the cost of children relevant to analyses of the demand for children.Yet
empirical studies of the cost of children typically include all (net)
expenditures on children up to a particular age, such asage eighteen,
without any discussion of whether these estimates are relevant to thestudy
of fertility.
Our analysis has important implications for the behavior ofaggregate
consumption. Per capita consumption is a weighted average of the consumption
of persons at different ages, where the weights are the fraction ofpersons
at each age, The rate of growth in per capita consumption between twotime
periods is3-;.
(43) =(L)9•,
Ct c jt jt
j=O
chere c is consumption per capita at time t, is the consumption of a
person aged j at time t, with the number of persons aged
at time t and the total population, and 9tct/Ct is the proportion
of total consumption accounted for by persons of age j. The symboldenote
the change in a variable between one time period and the next (for a given
value of age, j).
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (43) depends on the
change over time in the age distribution of the population. This term woulc
be zero in a demographic steady state, where9jt =0for all j. Moreover,
basic theorem of demography states that a closed population with constant
birth and death rates would eventually approach a demographic steady state
(see, for example, Coale. et al. ,1983).
The second tern on the right—hand side of equation (43) depends on the
rate of growth of consumption between generations. Equation (41) indicates
that the growth in consumption equals the growth in the cost of children.
the rate of growth of net costs is the constant g, then in a demographic




The rate of growth of per capita consumption is thenindependentof time38
preference, the degree of altruism, and the interest rate, and depends only
on the rate of growth of the cost of children.
Many have recognized that changes over time in per capita consumption are
independent of life-cycle changes in consumption when the age distribution is
constant (see Deaton, 1985, for a recent discussion). Some studies justify
the use of life-cycle models to interpret the data on aggregate consumption
by assuming that the representative person can be modeled as if he lives
forever. This procedure is sometimes rationalized by the assumption that
parents are altruistic toward children (see, e.g., Summers, 1981, p. 537).
Altruism does justify the assumption that heads of dynastic families
effectively have infinite lives. However, when fertility is endogenous,
models with effectively infinite lives that result from parental altruism
have implications for consumption that differ substantially from those of
models with infinite lives of representative persons. In our model,
steady—state consumption per descendant is independent of time preference and
interestrates because fertility fully absorbs the effects of these
variables.As a result, changes over time in per capita consumption in
demographic steady states do not depend on interest rates and time
preference, even though each dynastic family effectively lives forever.
Consider once again an open economy that initially has a steady level of
fertility and a constant rate of growth of consumption between generations.
Assume also that the age distribution is stable initially. A rise in the
world interest rate would Increase fertility (by equation (26)), which would
induce a transition to a new stable age distribution with a younger
population. The rate of growth of per capita consumption might change during39
the transition to the younger population, but would be the same in the new
steady state as in the initial state (as long as the rate of growth of the
net cost of producing descendants were unaffected by the rise in the world
interest rate). Perhaps this conclusion can explain what has been a puzzling
finding; namely, that long term growth rates of per capita consumption in the
United States apparently have not been affected by changes in long term real
interest rates (see
Summary and Conclusions
This paper develops the implications of altruism toward children, where
utility of parents depends on their own consumption and the utility of each
of their children. Altruism toward children implies that the welfare of all
generations of a family are llnke through a dynastic utility function that
depends on the consumption and number of descendants in all generations. The
head of a dynastic family acts as if he maximizes dynastic utility subject to
a dynastic budget constraint, which involves the wealth inherited by the
head, interest rates, the cost of rearing children in all generations, and
the earnings of all descendants.
Utility maximization Implies first, an arbitrage condition for
consumption over time, and second, the equation of the marginal benefit of an
additional child to the net cost of producing that child. This net cost
equals the expenses for child rearing less the present value of the child's
wages. We show that the optimization conditions relate the level of
consumption per person to the net cost of creating that person. Then the
arbitrage condition for consumption over time ends up implying a response of40
fertility-—but not of the growth of consumption per person——to variations in
interest rates and the degree of altruism.
We show that the number of descendants in each generation depends on the
net cost of producing those descendants. Thus fertility——which determines
the change in the number of descendants from one generation to the
next—-depends on changes in these net costs. For example, a permanent tax on
children lowers fertility in the generation that first faces the tax, and
permanently lowers the number of descendants in all subsequent generations.
But fertility in later generations is unchanged. We use this result to show
that a permanent reduction in the mortality rate initially raises population
growth, but has no long-run effect on this growth. Similarly, we find that
an expansion of social security has a temporary negative effect on population
growth.
We also consider representative dynastic families in open economies that
aL'elinkedto an international capital market with a single interest rate.
Fertility in open economies depends positively on the world interest rate, on
the degree of altruism, and on the growth of child-survival probabilities.
Fertility depends negatively on technological progress, and on the growth
rate of transfer payments. We conjecture that this analysis is relevant for
explaining fertility inWesterncountries during recent decades.
We incorporate life-cycle elements by allowing for consumption at various
ages. Life—cycle consumption is discounted by time preference, whereas a
child's consumption is discounted by time perference and the degree of
altruism. We now get the standard result that the pattern ofconsumption
over the life cycle depends on the interest rate and on time preference.Nevertheless, we still find that the growth rate of consumption between
generations depends on the growth rate of the net cost of creating
descendants, and not on the interest rate, time preference, or the degree of
altruism. At least in the long run, the growth of consumption between
generations will dictate the changes in consumption per person for the entire
economy. Therefore, we can explain the puzzling finding from long-teri
aggregate data that real interest rates and the growth rate of per capita
consumption are unrelated.
Thus far, our analysis neglects uncertainty, marriage, the spacing of
births, and capital-market constraints over life cycles or across
generations. Nevertheless, even the simplified model of altruism toward
children and the behavior of dynastic families appears to us to capture
important aspects of the dynamic behavior of fertility and consumption. If
so, a new approach would be warranted to the analysis of trends and long—term
fluctuations in consumption, fertility, and population growth.42
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1. Second-Order Conditions








where d is the discount factor as given by d =x(1 ÷r) N=1,and A












wherewe use the condition, d =d.(l÷r.). I—i 1 1








< 0.Since all second partlals from different periods (e.g., a2H/dc.ac.) are zero
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where the terms In the right column and bottom row are derivatives of the
budget constraint with respect to c1 and N1, respectively. By substituting
the first-order conditions (A.2) and (A.3) and simplifying, the condition for
a positive determinant is equivalent to (1—€)VVh/(V?)2< 0.If v(c) =
c0, this condition reduces to .÷ a< 1.
2. Stability Conditions
Costs of rearing children are now b(n) with b' > 0, b' > 0.The
elasticity of utility is assumed to be the constant a, and w. and r1 are
constant. Then equations (19) and (21) Imply




b'(nj(l÷r) -w-n.1b(n. i b(n11)Linearizing around the steady—state value, n =[aLl+r)]'€,leads to the











(A.12) 9 =b'(l÷r—n)—w+b> 0 (since the steady—state c is
positive in equation (21)), and
(A.13) (1 +r)> n for utility to be bounded.




=0are real. One root exceeds
one and can be excluded by the transversality condition since eventually







and Is positive and less than one (for t > 0).It follows that the path of
is (locally) stable and exhibits direct convergence to the steady—state
value n.